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Abstract
Decentralisation is widely practised but its scrutiny tends
to focus on structural and authority changes or outcomes.
Politics and process of devolution implementation
needs to be better understood to evaluate how national
governments use the enhanced decision space for bringing
improvements in the health system and the underlying
challenges faced. We use the example of Pakistan’s
radical, politically driven provincial devolution to analyse
how national structures use decentralisation opportunities
for improved health planning, spending and carrying out
transformations to the health system. Our narrative draws
on secondary data sources from the PRIMASYS study,
supplemented with policy roundtable notes from Pakistan.
Our analysis shows that in decentralised Pakistan, health
became prioritised for increased government resources
and achieved good budgetary use, major strides were
made contextualised sector-wide health planning and
legislations, and a proliferation seen in governance
measures to improve and regulate healthcare delivery.
Despite a disadvantaged and abrupt start to devolution,
high ownership by politicians and bureaucracy in provincial
governments led to resourcing, planning and innovations.
However, effective translation remained impeded by weak
institutional capacity, feeble federal–provincial coordination
and vulnerability to interference by local elites.
Building on this illustrative example, we propose (1)
political management of decentralisation for effective
national coordination, sustaining stable leadership and
protecting from political interfere by local elites; (2)
investment in stewardship capacity in the devolved
structures as well as the central ministry to deliver on new
roles.

Introduction
Decentralisation, in its various forms, is widely
practised across low-income and middle-income countries (LMICs), including Kenya,
Uganda, Nigeria and Ethiopia in Africa,
Brazil, Peru and Mexico in Latin America,
and Nepal, Indonesia and China in Asia.1
Technical arguments for decentralisation
include local accountability, participatory
governance, improved responsiveness and
managerial efficiency.2 Administratively,

Summary box
A process analysis of response to decentralisation
in Pakistan and its consequences on health systems
comes up with five main findings:
►► Devolution led to increased government health allocations, sector-wide planning and governance
innovations.
►► Enthusiasm and ownership within subnational political–bureaucratic circles provided support.
►► Weak national coordination capacity at centre and
insufficient stewardship capacity in provinces impeded progress.
►► Health systems became more vulnerable to local
political interference requiring active management.
►► Decentralisation implementation requires continued centre-province discussion on unresolved
boundaries.

decentralisation can be expressed in milder
forms of delegating authority to a lower
organisational level, in more advanced forms
involving the transfer of authority to a lower
or parallel administrative level, or devolution
which is the total divesture of responsibility at
the centre and its assumption by a lower tier.3
Scrutiny of decentralisation has predominantly focused on structural changes, extent
of decision space provided or performance
in terms of better equity, efficiency and
accountability.3–5 We contend that decentralisation assessments are incomplete unless
the process and politics of decentralisation is
also examined. This is an important and relevant dimension as decentralisation is often
brought in as part of a radical political change
with demands for redistribution in resources,
responsibilities and accountabilities,6–9 and
performance is often unpredictable, mixed
and dependent on the context in which
decentralisation is implemented.10
In this paper, we present an analysis of
improvements to health systems in Pakistan,
in response to a politically driven devolution
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process. Devolution represents the most radical form of
decentralisation. In 2010, Pakistan dissolved 17 federal
ministries devolving legislative, operational and financial
responsibilities to its four provinces.11 The devolution
was undertaken through a major constitutional amendment unanimously supported by all political parties to
meet the long-standing provincial demands for a lead
role in shaping and implementing policies, a more equitable financial share and more locally responsive solutions particularly in the social sector.
The analysis aims to better understand and evaluate
how subnational structures use decentralisation opportunities for improved planning, spending and carrying out
transformations to the health system. Our narrative first
landscapes the radical change in subnational authority
and the process of abrupt devolution and subsequent
partial recentralisation. Next, we analyse progress towards
meeting devolution objectives in three areas: (1) did
increased provincial resources translate into increased
government expenditure for health?; (2) did enhanced
provincial policy role lead to improvements in the
health planning process?; (3) what progress was made in
reform for health systems? Based on the above, we draw
implications on how subnational governments used the
enhanced decision space and influence of ownership,
capacity, coordination and leadership factors.
The paper draw on findings from the Primary Care
Systems Profile and Performance (PRIMASYS) Pakistan
study conducted in 2016 by the authors. PRIMASYS
probed structural aspects and processes of recent Primary
Health Care planning, reforms and innovations.12 Additionally, minutes of national consultative policy round
tables conducted for developing Pakistan’s National
Health Vision 2016–2513 were analysed to identify success
and barriers to post devolution health systems responses.

Box 1 Data sources: our narrative drew on the following
secondary data sources:
►► Desk review conducted for PRIMASYS that included the National

Finance Commission Award, post-devolution concurrent legislative
list for health, provincial situation analysis reports, provincial health
sector strategies, budgetary review of reconciled expenditure
2009/2010−2013/2014, provincial reform acts and legislations,
organograms of national and provincial ministries, new PC-1s, important notifications, National Health Accounts, national health surveys, WHO mission reports, independent assessment reports.
►► Analysis from 26 key informant interviews conducted during
PRIMASYS: conducted to identify and explore two reform pathways—an initiative that progressed well and another that got hindered. Key informants were those who had been part of the post
devolution initiative.
►► Minutes of six national policy roundtables conducted for development of National Health Vision: 25–40 participants per roundtable, included representatives of national and provincial health
ministries, NGOs, technical assistance agencies, experts, international development partners, private industry, medical and nursing
associations.

2

This was supplemented with updates and insights from
the authors (box 1).
Devolution: extensive authority, abrupt process and
partial recentralisation
Pakistan population of 207 million14 is spread over four
provinces—Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and
Baluchistan—and a small portion resides in federally
controlled territories. Each province is geographically
diverse, has a distinctive culture, regional language and
distinct political following. Health has constitutionally
been the provincial government’s responsibility; however,
the presence of a concurrent legislative list allowed the
fluid sharing of powers between the federal and provincial
government.15 In practice, the federal ministry took lead
in health planning, service delivery programming and
monitoring, aid coordination, human resource and drug
licensing and regulations. Over time, it also expanded
into funding and management of the larger health
hospitals.16 Provincial governments, while being a major
co-financer of health, mainly had a passive role confined
to administration of health facilities and programmes.
Devolution was preceded by a radical change in federal–
provincial resource distribution formula of 2009 with
majority share (56%–58%) going to provinces.17 It is also
an equity-based formula for distribution of resources to
the less populated provinces by factoring in development
needs and security challenges.18
Process of transitioning of power from federal to
provincial government was abrupt. The 2010 devolution
abolished the ‘concurrent legislative list’ and replaced
it with an exclusive shorter list of federal powers and
a longer list of exclusive provincial powers. The functions of health planning, legislation, service regulation,
financing service delivery, human resource production
and service delivery programming were devolved to the
provinces (table 1). During the 14 months between devolution being promulgated into law (April 2010) to abolishment of the Ministry of Health (MoH) (June 2011),
there was scant discussion and planning undertaken by
the federal ministry with provinces. Hence, provinces
were overnight confronted with additional responsibilities with resourcing and planning yet to be worked out.
The provincial governments were not prepared for post
devolution (budgetary) scenario. Only one workshop was
conducted whereby future of National Institute of Health
(NIH) Islamabad was discussed in light of devolution, but
federal managed tertiary institutes were not discussed. As a
result we had a fiasco at JPMC (Jinnah Postgraduate Medical Centre) and the matter went into litigation. (provincial
health ministry)

The federal powers retained were dispersed across
the remaining federal institutions such as the Planning
Commission, Federal Bureau of Statistics19 and a newly
set up Inter-Provincial Ministry. This posed issues in
national coordination for global health commitments,
drugs licensing, and regulation of medical and nursing
Zaidi SA, et al. BMJ Glob Health 2019;4:e001013. doi:10.1136/bmjgh-2018-001013
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Table 1 Distribution of federal–provincial roles and authority
Functions

Federal

Provincial

Health planning
Financing

International agreements and targets
Co-financing preventive vertical programmes
(interim arrangement)
Insurance regulation

Policies, strategies, plans, legislations
Financing curative+preventive
Financing arrangements

Human resource

Licensing HR production

HR planning, deployment, management

Service delivery

Oversight on international agreements

Services menu, programming, implementation

Drug supply

Licensing, registration pricing

Market surveillance, supply systems

Health information
system
Governance

Research
Surveillance
Standard setting

Monitoring & Evaluation
Surveillance
Strategic purchasing, regulation, accountability

Source: Federal Legislative List Parts I and II.

professions. A multidonor WHO mission in 2012 recommended that dispersed federal powers be assembled into
the Inter-Provincial Ministry for coherence.20 However,
health functions were hurriedly reassembled into a separate federal ministry in 2013 during tenure of a caretaker
government through a direct executive order, amalgamating a National Regualtions Ministry established in
2012 into the Ministry of National Health Services Regulation and Coordination (MoNHSRC). It has struggled
to recover legitimacy as its existence is contested both
by provinces as well as the federal entities to which its
functions had originally been passed on. Post devolution,
at least eight new federal ministries have been created
without going through parliamentary approval process.21
Hence, the process of recentralisation started in the early
years of devolution, but the remits of new central structures remains vague and unsettled.
Government spending on health
Health spending post devolution depends largely on
provincial contributions. A single line budgetary transfer
is made to the provinces from the central tax revenue
pool and then proportionate allocation to health and
sectors by provinces in line respective provincial priorities. Provinces reacted to devolution through a steady and
tangible increase in proportionate spending on health.
Increased budget allocation for health is seen in all provinces ranging from 50% to threefold. Provincial contribution to the country’s government health expenditure
has risen from 72% in 2009/10% to 82% in 2013/2014.
There is also a visible rise in per capita health allocations
by provincial governments (table 2). Increased provincial spending has also contributed to a faster growth
of national consolidated government health expenditure in the country compared with the country’s overall
health expenditure.22 Provincial budget execution rates
have remained over 75% despite a sharp increase in
health allocations.22 Strong ownership has been seen by
the provincial political legislature in approving health
Zaidi SA, et al. BMJ Glob Health 2019;4:e001013. doi:10.1136/bmjgh-2018-001013

budgets, constitution of provincial standing committees
on health and prioritisation of health by chief ministers
of all provinces.
At the same time, there has been fiscal stress due to
insufficient and delayed fiscal transfers from the health
portion of federal budget that was committed pre-devolution. Federal health transfers comprise an important
chunk of funding to financed vertical programmes, the
extensive Lady Health Workers Program and tertiary
hospitals under federal management. Insufficient federal
fiscal transfers have precipitated doctors’ strikes at leading
tertiary hospitals, protests by community health workers
and stock out of supplies of vertical programmes.23 24 The
gap has been partially adjusted by provinces through
either own resources or international donor support.
Despite increased allocations, salaries continue to
consume the major portion of the provincial health
budgets and the share has even risen in some provinces (table 2). There is a policy push for recruitment
of doctors and specialists rather than less costly frontline health workers. There is also a demand by provincial legislators for jobs provision to their constituents in
government services.
Stewardship and planning
In Pakistan, sector-wide planning was initiated for the
first time after provincial devolution. Health policies
were few and far between—only four health polices had
been formulated in Pakistan’s 64-year history prior to
devolution—these were mainly disease oriented, focused
on the government sector delivery and not translated
into operational planning.16 Planning had traditionally
followed a project mode, shaped by specific government
or donor-funded projects and vertical programmes.
Project formulation was largely federally driven and had
a rigidly tailored design across all provinces. Post devolution, provinces were confronted with a vacuum of sectorwide policy and planning for fulfilling the new stewardship function.
3
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Table 2 Health allocation and expenditure by provincial governments
BE 2009/2010

BE 2010/2011

Provincial per capita allocation on health (US$)
7.5
9.1
 Punjab

BE 2011/2012

BE 2012/2013

BE 2013/2014

8.6

9.6

10.4

 Sindh

7.0

7.9

8.8

10.9

12.9

 Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

4.1

6.0

5.9

7.8

8.7

 Baluchistan

6.2

9.0

11.3

11.9

15.6

Provincial health budget spending by salary vs non-salary (%)
 Punjab
 Salary

43%

48%

53%

57%

58%

  Non-salary

57%

52%

47%

43%

42%

  Salary

56%

58%

56%

55%

56%

  Non-salary

44%

42%

44%

45%

44%

  Salary

60%

68%

72%

68%

63%

  Non-salary

40%

32%

28%

32%

37%

80%
20%

66%
34%

70%
30%

73%
27%

73%
27%

 Sindh

 Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

 Baluchistan
  Salary
  Non-salary

Source: consolidated annual health budgets of provincial finance departments; consolidated health expenditure from public
accounts data 2009–2014; provincial population growth rates from National Census 2016–2017.

The devolution was thrown to the provinces with a single
stroke of the pen; the provinces had neither the capacity nor were administratively ready to take this up. That is
when we decided to develop provincial health sector strategy. (provincial health ministry)

Over the first 2 years of devolution, the provinces came
up with province-specific Health Sector Strategies laying
out a 10-year strategic direction across public and private
health sectors. These were assisted by bilateral aid agencies and the World Bank, with donors viewing this as an
opportune window to engage with provinces. In two of
the provinces—Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa—the
planning process moved forward to the district level with
the development of District Health Plans. Roadmaps are
in place in Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to improve
public service delivery using defined targets, regular
stock-takes and investment in data. A significant increase
in legislative activities has been seen across all four provinces. Legislations have for the first time been directed
towards important health reform areas of Public Private
Partnerships, Health Services Regulation and Autonomy
of Teaching Hospitals. Certain level of restructuring of
provincial Health Departments has also taken place to
steer health stewardship. At least two provinces have
established policy or reforms units, and one province
has further restructured the health ministry to create a
new department for primary and secondary care so as to
4

ring fence administrative attention and resourcing for
primary care (table 3).
However, health sector strategies, plans and legislations formulated remain unevenly implemented and
only partially adjusted within health budgets.19 There are
frequent instances of ad hoc initiatives for hospital infrastructure schemes, tertiary specialists units and medical
colleges, popular with political leaderships and providing
visibility for electorates. Capability is weak to build linkages between reform, planning and budgeting. Technical assistance for reforms provided by donors remains
clustered in the better-performing resourced provinces
of Punjab and Khyber Pukhtunkhwa, with less in Sindh
and none in Baluchistan, hence further exacerbating
inequities in terms of capability in terms of responding
to devolution.

Governance innovations for improving primary
healthcare
Post devolution, governance reforms to improve primary
care service delivery have been attempted in all provinces
but with varying success. We bring here two contrasting
pathways taken to improve primary care delivery—
the first example of private sector harnessing through
contracting and regulation is an example that fared
better whereas the second example of attempt towards
Zaidi SA, et al. BMJ Glob Health 2019;4:e001013. doi:10.1136/bmjgh-2018-001013
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Single integrated project, but
Functional integration proposed.
parallel programmes coexist
Not implemented
Under consideration
New modalities:
►► Regulatory health commission
►► Contracting-out started for
district health systems in six
districts, rolled back
Private sector harnessing

Functional integration into three
programmes
New modalities:
►► Regulatory health commission
►► Contracting out of equipment/
technology maintenance
►► Contracting out of medicine
and supplies delivery
►► Contracting out of facilities
maintenance
Service delivery integration

Functional integration proposed.
Not implemented
New modalities:
►► Regulatory health commission
►► Contracting-out management
of secondary facilities in nine
districts
►► Contracting-out ambulance
services, in selected districts

Developed and costed
Developed and costed

Under consideration
Notified
Established and functional

Developed and costed

Regulatory authorities

Minimum service delivery
package

Developed and costed

Sector strategy developed
Sector strategy district action
plans developed
Planning

Sector strategy developed.
Roadmap for primary care in
place

Sector strategy and district
action plans developed.
Roadmap for primary care in
place
Established and functional

Baluchistan
Khyber Pukhtunkhwa
Sindh
Punjab

Provincial planning and governance initiatives
Table 3

Zaidi SA, et al. BMJ Glob Health 2019;4:e001013. doi:10.1136/bmjgh-2018-001013

integrating preventive healthcare delivery highlights
failed resilience (table 3).
Private sector harnessing
Pakistan has a mixed health system for primary care
comprising a large network of government health facilities, private individual practitioners, philanthropic organisations and private medical entities. Government health
facilities especially in rural areas have had low use, poor
maintenance and poor quality of care.25 Post devolution, there are noticeable attempts to harness the private
sector through regulation and purchasing of services.
Post devolution, government regulation of private
providers is underway to reduce high levels of quackery
and has been introduced in three provinces. There has
also been a noticeable appetite among provinces to learn
on private sector experiences from each other. Regulatory Health Commissions established in one province
to regulate health services have been replicated in two
other provinces. Licensing of facilities is well underway;
however, the more ambitious quality assurance function lacks capacity. Legislative cover has been provided
through the Public Private Partnerships and Health
Services Regulation passed by the provincial assemblies.26 27 Another initiative to tighten market pharmacies
and drug outlets is underway in one province, assisted
by an expanded drug inspector workforce and computerised tagging of pharmacies.
Purchasing of private sector services has also gained
policy foothold post devolution. The over-riding intent
by provincial governments remains on improving the
functionality of government health services through
using private professionalised providers. Contracting
the management of Basic Health Units (BHUs) NGO
was first initiated in mid-2000s across all provinces by
a federally led initiative,28 29 but based on single source
contract. Post devolution, there has been (1) an expansion and diversification in number of private suppliers
that include private hospital, development charities and
private commercial firms; (2) expansion from BHU to
contracting for rural health centres, district hospitals,
referral hospitals and so on; (3) expansion from clinical
to support services such as transportation of supplies,
equipment maintenance and repairs, ambulance
services and so on30 (table 3). Separate public–private
partnership (PPP) units for contracting have been set
up in the provincial health ministries of the two provinces for managing and monitoring PPPs, but there
are serious capacity gaps in managing the contracting
process to bring in qualified providers, link budgetary
disbursements with outputs, and effectively monitor
contracts.31
Provincial planners and implementers like to learn from
each other and even compete in performing in certain
areas such as regulation and public private partnerships.
(independent expert)
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Integrating vertical healthcare programs
Pakistan has a long history of implementing vertical
preventive health programmes, programmed by the
federal ministry and co-financed by both federal and
provincial ministries. At the time of devolution, there
were 10 vertical programmes that include Expanded
Program of Immunization, Roll Back Malaria, TB-DOTs,
HIV AIDS Control, TB-DOTs, Maternal Newborn and
Child Health, Nutrition Support Program, Blindness
Control, Avian Flu, and Hepatitis B and C Control. Vertical
programmes while providing the benefit of focused oversight have created fragmented service delivery, duplication of resources and delayed financial releases because
of centralised budgets.32–35 Although vertical projects
are required to be integrated into regular budgets and
district staffing after a period of 4–5 years, some vertical
programmes have been running for more than 30 years.
Post devolution, the declining federal support and
challenge of expanding coverage to under-covered areas
compelled provinces to re-look vertical programmes.
Vertical programme integration was prioritised under
provincial health sector strategies and costed Essential
Health Service Delivery Packages were developed with
donor technical assistance (table 3).36–38 One province
moved ahead combining four overlapping programmes
into a single integrated health project39 while another
functionally integrated the 10 preventive programmes
into three major programmes. Despite these beginnings, vertical programmes have largely continued in
parallel. One of the blocks has been the continuation
of federal funding line for vertical programmes and
hampers creation of integrated budgeting. A fresh cycle
of vertical projects has been started by the new federal
health ministry and posts of federal vertical programme
directors have been revived, hence re-establishing federal
verticalised authority over preventive care. Constraints
for integration are also seen in the provinces. Vertical
programme integration is actively resisted by provincial
vertical programme managers, who often enjoy backing
from provincial legislatures—this has moved integration
from a high-priority agenda to a de-prioritised agenda.

health in all four provinces led to increased resourcing
of health from government budget, push for provincial
planning and monitoring, as well as support for regulation, contracting and other governance initiatives to
circumvent slow-moving government systems to deliver
results. At the same time, the loosening of federal verticality made the provinces vulnerable to interference by
provincial political elites. Political pressure for visible
health infrastructure projects, specialty schemes, recruitment of local constituents and instances of favoured
appointments was seen in all provinces, often derailing
health sector strategies. Provinces where health ministries had strong executive backing were better able to
withstand political pressures than those that were not
closely aligned to provincial leadership. Trained human
resource and lack of support systems has blunted progress of sector strategies despite an appetite for health
reforms. Frequent change in health secretaries in
all provinces further interrupted the momentum of
progress.
In Provinces A&B __ there is clear divide in (provincial)
government on ethnic grounds. This has resulted in divided bureaucracy and (politically) always a coalition government with ministers maneuvering their own chosen
Secretaries and other staff in clear violation of merit and
seniority. This results in a kind of institutional and governance break down. (provincial planning and development
department)
Frequent transfer and postings at senior management level especially of Secretary of Health results in coordination
gaps to address health issues and also a lack of interest at
all levels. (development partner).

Leadership support, capacity and federal–provincial
coordination
Proliferation in health systems initiatives post devolution
has been driven by strong support by provincial governments and the civil bureaucracy. At the same time, key
factors need to be understood that have constrained
effective translation.
The provinces had a disadvantaged start in terms of
technical capability as the past context of federally dominated political, fiscal, administrative power stunted the
maturity of provincial administrative structures. Strong
political support for devolution and visible ownership of

Weak federal–provincial coordination is also responsible for slowing transformative change. Transition of
devolutionary powers was abrupt taking place without
planning discussions between the federal ministry with
provincial counterparts. As a result, there continue to be
unresolved resourcing and administrative issues, dodging
the federal–provincial relationship over the past 7 years.
Federal dialogue with provinces has remained ad hoc
post devolution and is usually precipitated by crisis such
as polio outbreaks or vertical initiatives championed by
MoNHSRC. As yet, there has been a lack of national leadership to address outstanding federal–provincial issues,
coordinate on a common national direction and allow
lessons sharing across provinces.
The federal ministry also has capacity issues—it has
been re-populated with former staff experienced in
vertical programme management, but lacks expertise
for its new role of coordination and regulation across
the diverse provinces.19 Technical assistance provision to
the federal health ministry has been overlooked by international donors and placed solely to the sources. Above
all, the ministry lacks federal political clout, perceived in
executive circles as a low resourced ministry with ill-defined functions.

6

Zaidi SA, et al. BMJ Glob Health 2019;4:e001013. doi:10.1136/bmjgh-2018-001013

Behind every vertical program is a politician. How can
change be brought in such a context? (vertical programme
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Conclusion
We assessed Pakistan’s 2010 provincial health devolution against devolution’s intended outcomes of better
resourcing, improved planning and local contextual
innovations. By focusing on the critically less understood
area of processes and politics, we explored why certain
initiatives progressed better and other did not, so as to
better manage decentralisation experiences. Our analysis
did not assess performance outcomes and its attribution
to specific health reforms post devolution.
In decentralised Pakistan, health became prioritised
for increased government resources and achieved good
budgetary use. However, allocation priorities were not
effectively adjusted and there was little effort at targeting
of inequities. Major strides were made in terms of provincially contextualised sector-wide health planning and
legislations, but implementation has been weakly steered.
There has also been a feverish proliferation in governance measures to improve, professionalise and regulate
healthcare delivery. Some have had wide roll-out, others
have been only partially implemented and at times, even
aborted.
Global findings show that political decentralisation
is associated with higher health expenditures and even
higher in case of both political and fiscal decentralisation.40–43 Latin American countries’ experience shows
decentralised governments were successful in mobilising additional household sources,8 44 which we did
not see in the case of Pakistan. Decentralisation experiences in Kenya,45 46 Nigeria47 and Mexico48 report weak
mechanisms for resource management in subnational
governments. There is scant evidence from developing
economies on post devolution planning and governance;
however, literature from Sweden and UK supports the
case of improved regional planning and innovations post
decentralisation.
Our analysis shows that high political-bureaucratic
ownership of health facilitated progress but weak stewardship skills and frequent leadership changes at subnational level, vulnerability to interference by local elites
and feeble national coordination constrained effective
implementation. The federal–provincial relationship
post devolution remained troublesome having a disadvantaged start with abrupt transitioning, unresolved
resource sharing issues and ad hoc vertically led dialogue.
There is scant literature on politics of health decentralisation in LMICs. Chaotic interprovincial coordination is
reported from West and Central African states, where the
central government resisted relinquishing resources and
attempted to re-empower the central government.44 49–53
LAC experience analysed by Bossert et al highlights
the value of incentives to make subnational structures
perform which was missing in Pakistan’s decentralisation
design government.
We contend that examination of decentralisation
should be expanded to include process assessments to
detect challenges and help manage responses. We propose
a few recommendations. First, investment for technical
Zaidi SA, et al. BMJ Glob Health 2019;4:e001013. doi:10.1136/bmjgh-2018-001013

capability development in devolved structures is required
early on as most decentralisation experiences in LMICs,
driven by sweeping political process, will not provide
time for a learning-by-doing incrementalist approach
seen in technical driven experiments with decentralisation in OECD countries. Second, technical support for
the central level to shift to a new modus operandi should
not be over-looked as part of capacity building efforts.
Third, measures are needed for political management of
decentralisation to safeguard against local political pressures, leadership stability, and continued centre-province discussion on issue interpretation and consensus
building.
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